Flying with the TSA
[to the tune of “Charlie on the MTA”]
[Spoken: This part isn’t on some of the recordings]
These are the times that try men's souls. In the course of our nation's history, the people of this nation have rallied bravely whenever the rights of men have been threatened. Today, a new crisis has arisen. The Transportation Security Agency, better known as the TSA, is executing illegal assaults on the population in the form of unconstitutional searches. Citizens, hear me out! This could happen to you!
[Sung:]
Well, let me tell you of the story of a man named Charlie,
On a tragic and fateful day.
He put his phone in his pocket, kissed his wife and family,
Went to fly in the USA
(Well, did he ever return? No, he never returned.)
(And his fate is still unlearned.)
(He may remain forever at the TSA checkpoint.)
(He's the man who never returned.)
Charlie showed them his ticket at the TSA checkpoint,
Just hoping to catch his Plane.
When he got there the agent told him, "One more pat down."
Charlie could't get onto that plane.
(But, did he ever return? No, he never returned.)
(And his fate is still unlearned.)
(He may remain forever in the airport terminal.)
(He's the man who never returned.)
Now, all night long Charlie stands spread eagle,
Wonderin’, "Where will they touch me next?
I can’t let this happen to my sister in Dallas,
It’s all based on a false pretext”
(But, did he ever return? No, he never returned.)
(And his fate is still unlearned.)
(He may remain forever in the airport terminal.)
(He's the man who never returned.)
Charlie's wife goes down to the TSA checkpoint,
Every day at quarter past two.
And she keeps filming those pat downs as Charlie stands helpless,
As the TSA searches continue.
(Well, did he ever return? No, he never returned.)
(And his fate is still unlearned.)
(He may remain forever at the TSA checkpoint.)
(He's the man who never returned.)
Now citizens of the nation, don't you think it's a scandal,
How people are assaulted every day?
Fight for sane and sensible airport security!
Let’s get rid of the TSA!
(Or else we'll never return. No, we'll never return.)
(And our fate will be unlearn'd.)
(We may remain forever at the TSA checkpoint.)
(We'll be the ones who never returned.)
(We'll be the ones who never returned.)
(We'll be the ones who never returned.)
-- Geoff Strickler
-- May 8, 2011
Showing posts with label TSA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TSA. Show all posts
Sunday, May 8, 2011
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Major Security Oversight
Originally published as a note on my Facebook page Nov 18, 2010
Ladies and Gentlemen, flight crew and flight attendants, we have overlooked something major. The White House, US Capitol, and the Pentagon are all known terrorist targets. Planes were merely the method used to attack those targets. If terrorists can no longer use planes to attack these targets, they will use more direct attacks. Therefore, we need to petition our government to immediately install backscatter scanners and implement enhanced pat-down procedures at each of these locations.
No one should be allowed to enter these facilities without going through the scanner or pat-down. Not our elected officials, not the military, not the employees, not even the President, first lady, or their young daughters. These are high value targets, and we can't be too safe. In fact, given that the backscatter machines do not show anything inside the body, they should install both backscatter and millimeter wave scanners and everyone must pass through both to be sure they're not carrying any contraband.
Furthermore, if the terrorists can disrupt our security forces, that would give them more access, therefore the DHS and TSA offices become high value targets too, and they must also have these scanners and pat-down procedures immediately.
I believe we should extend this to all state government capital buildings as well, or at least for the most populous states, NY, CA, FL, TX, OH, IL, PA, MI, GA, NC, NJ, & VA. We should include MD because of it's proximity to DC. And we should include AK, HI, and RI since they're physically disconnected from the continental US.
Please, I urge you to immediately contact your state and federal representatives demanding that they correct this oversight that puts the entire government of the country at risk of terrorist attack, and by extension, puts everyone in the country at risk. I am horrified that we've left these high profile targets unprotected for this long.
Satirically yours,
Geoff Strickler
P.S. I was going to title this "Porno scanners and en-hands-ed feel-ups everywhere", but I didn't want to give away the satire too soon.
Ladies and Gentlemen, flight crew and flight attendants, we have overlooked something major. The White House, US Capitol, and the Pentagon are all known terrorist targets. Planes were merely the method used to attack those targets. If terrorists can no longer use planes to attack these targets, they will use more direct attacks. Therefore, we need to petition our government to immediately install backscatter scanners and implement enhanced pat-down procedures at each of these locations.
No one should be allowed to enter these facilities without going through the scanner or pat-down. Not our elected officials, not the military, not the employees, not even the President, first lady, or their young daughters. These are high value targets, and we can't be too safe. In fact, given that the backscatter machines do not show anything inside the body, they should install both backscatter and millimeter wave scanners and everyone must pass through both to be sure they're not carrying any contraband.
Furthermore, if the terrorists can disrupt our security forces, that would give them more access, therefore the DHS and TSA offices become high value targets too, and they must also have these scanners and pat-down procedures immediately.
I believe we should extend this to all state government capital buildings as well, or at least for the most populous states, NY, CA, FL, TX, OH, IL, PA, MI, GA, NC, NJ, & VA. We should include MD because of it's proximity to DC. And we should include AK, HI, and RI since they're physically disconnected from the continental US.
Please, I urge you to immediately contact your state and federal representatives demanding that they correct this oversight that puts the entire government of the country at risk of terrorist attack, and by extension, puts everyone in the country at risk. I am horrified that we've left these high profile targets unprotected for this long.
Satirically yours,
Geoff Strickler
P.S. I was going to title this "Porno scanners and en-hands-ed feel-ups everywhere", but I didn't want to give away the satire too soon.
Song: Don't Fly
Originally published as a note on my Facebook page Nov 16, 2010
Don’t Fly
(to the tune of “Don’t Cry” by Asia)
Original Songwriters: John Wetton & Geoff Downes
New lyrics by Geoff Strickler
Hard times you had before you, I knew when they first saw you
You girl, you’re gonna be selected, inspected
So leave your stuff behind you, they’ve looked so long to find you
I know this search will last forever, ever and more, oh, oh, oh
Don't fly, now they’re gonna hound you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Don't fly, their groping will astound you
They do what they want so little darlin' please don't fly
I knew you’d be selected, knew you would be rejected
Don't think it’s like it’s been before
They'll watch you when you're scanning, they’ll grope you when you're standing.
Don't argue if you want to ever get on board, oh, oh, oh
Don't fly, now they’re gonna hound you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Don't fly, their groping will astound you
They do what they want so little darlin' please don't fly
(repeat previous verse 2 more times)
Don't fly, don't fly, don't fly
Don't fly, don't fly, don't fly
Don't fly, they’ve looked so long to find you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Edit 2011-04-29: minor updates.
Edit 2014-04-28: minor updates.
Don’t Fly
(to the tune of “Don’t Cry” by Asia)
Original Songwriters: John Wetton & Geoff Downes
New lyrics by Geoff Strickler
Hard times you had before you, I knew when they first saw you
You girl, you’re gonna be selected, inspected
So leave your stuff behind you, they’ve looked so long to find you
I know this search will last forever, ever and more, oh, oh, oh
Don't fly, now they’re gonna hound you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Don't fly, their groping will astound you
They do what they want so little darlin' please don't fly
I knew you’d be selected, knew you would be rejected
Don't think it’s like it’s been before
They'll watch you when you're scanning, they’ll grope you when you're standing.
Don't argue if you want to ever get on board, oh, oh, oh
Don't fly, now they’re gonna hound you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Don't fly, their groping will astound you
They do what they want so little darlin' please don't fly
(repeat previous verse 2 more times)
Don't fly, don't fly, don't fly
Don't fly, don't fly, don't fly
Don't fly, they’ve looked so long to find you
Don't fly, they’ll take a look around you
Edit 2011-04-29: minor updates.
Edit 2014-04-28: minor updates.
How to Have Effective Airport Security.
Originally published as a note on my Facebook page Nov 17, 2010.
1. Use explosive sniffing dogs and/or electronic explosive sniffers (not scanners). Note that these are effective at a distance and do not require any invasion of someone's privacy.
2. Use metal detectors to detect guns, knives, etc just as they've been doing for 30 years.
3. Increase the security of cargo and baggage (including carry-on), use improved scanners, sniffers, etc. There are no major privacy or health concerns involved here, and a bomb in the baggage/cargo area is absolutely the least desirable location. There is always a weakest point in any security system. Criminals will usually attack the weakest point. You want the weakest point in airline security to be with the passengers. If the threat is in the passenger compartment, the passengers, crew, and air marshals have a chance to stop it, as they have done repeatedly since 9/11. If it's in the cargo/baggage compartment, you're dead.
4. Allow behavioral profiling. Said in a less politically charged way, allow the screeners to perform additional screening of someone whom they believe looks or acts "suspicious" (e.g. they have probable cause to investigate and if needed perform additional searches). There will need to be limits, so that it's not abused. After the first 2 screening steps, this should rarely occur, but it's important that it be allowable.
5. Recognize and acknowledge that no amount of security is going to stop all committed terrorists. There is a point of diminishing returns where the "unreasonableness" of the security exceeds any theoretical increase in safety. Therefore, there is such a thing as "good enough" security, and the final security is ALWAYS going fall to the air marshals, passengers, and crew of the aircraft. Everyone except the TSA has realized this fact since United 93. Invading someone's privacy adds no more security.
Let's roll.
Update 2010-11-19
Minor edits to the above.
While the above is my own model, it's come to my attention that this is a slightly simplified version of what Israel uses at Ben Gurion airport, an airport known for effective and efficient security that is not invasive. For more info on the Israeli airport security, see:
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/744199---israelification-high-security-little-bother
Bruce Schneier's blog on TSA issues.
Update 2010-11-26
A similar proposal on cnn.com
1. Use explosive sniffing dogs and/or electronic explosive sniffers (not scanners). Note that these are effective at a distance and do not require any invasion of someone's privacy.
2. Use metal detectors to detect guns, knives, etc just as they've been doing for 30 years.
3. Increase the security of cargo and baggage (including carry-on), use improved scanners, sniffers, etc. There are no major privacy or health concerns involved here, and a bomb in the baggage/cargo area is absolutely the least desirable location. There is always a weakest point in any security system. Criminals will usually attack the weakest point. You want the weakest point in airline security to be with the passengers. If the threat is in the passenger compartment, the passengers, crew, and air marshals have a chance to stop it, as they have done repeatedly since 9/11. If it's in the cargo/baggage compartment, you're dead.
4. Allow behavioral profiling. Said in a less politically charged way, allow the screeners to perform additional screening of someone whom they believe looks or acts "suspicious" (e.g. they have probable cause to investigate and if needed perform additional searches). There will need to be limits, so that it's not abused. After the first 2 screening steps, this should rarely occur, but it's important that it be allowable.
5. Recognize and acknowledge that no amount of security is going to stop all committed terrorists. There is a point of diminishing returns where the "unreasonableness" of the security exceeds any theoretical increase in safety. Therefore, there is such a thing as "good enough" security, and the final security is ALWAYS going fall to the air marshals, passengers, and crew of the aircraft. Everyone except the TSA has realized this fact since United 93. Invading someone's privacy adds no more security.
Let's roll.
Update 2010-11-19
Minor edits to the above.
While the above is my own model, it's come to my attention that this is a slightly simplified version of what Israel uses at Ben Gurion airport, an airport known for effective and efficient security that is not invasive. For more info on the Israeli airport security, see:
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/744199---israelification-high-security-little-bother
Bruce Schneier's blog on TSA issues.
Update 2010-11-26
A similar proposal on cnn.com
Questions for Those Who Think the New Airport Scanners Are Justified.
Originally published as a note on my Facebook page Nov 19, 2010
Here are my questions for anyone who believes the new scanners and pat down procedures are justified because they make flying safer:
Q: Would you rather be blown up by a bomb around a terrorist's waist, or a bomb up his a$$?
I know it's a little crude, but it's intended to be shocking. The new scanners won't detect bombs or other items inside the body, won't detect powders, and according to a GAO report, probably would not have detected the "underwear" bomb.
Q: Aren't there better scanners that can detect those?
A: Yes, they're called "trace detectors" or "sniffers", and they don't require x-raying you or taking naked images of you for them to work. They also don't require anyone touching you. We've been using them in a limited capacity for years, so why should we use expensive and invasive new scanners that won't work as well?
Here's an Interesting interview with a former TSA/FAA inspector:
Interviewer: "Are people in airports that don't have the new AIT scanners less safe?"
Consultant: "No."
She also stated that the TSA plans to make the full-body scanners the primary screening method, replacing the metal detectors. So, while right now, few people will go through the scanner, eventually, they intend to make everyone go through.
-----
Bottom line, the new "porno scanners" and "en-hands-ed feel-up" procedures are security theater, they give the illusion of better security, but they do not improve safety at all. At the same time, they're grossly invasive and therefore, violate your 4th Amendment rights agains "unreasonable" searches of your person.
No amount of security can keep all dangerous items off an aircraft. A dedicated attacker will find a way, even if everyone were submitted to strip searches, body cavity searches, x-rays, explosive sniffers, and any other form of "security" you can dream up.
You can not prevent all attacks on board, much less all the external attacks (LAWS rocket, SAM, etc.) or simply attacking the terminal before going though security.
When you finally realize that it's impossible to have complete "safety and security", then the only conclusion left is that at some point there is "enough safety and security", and each increase comes at a loss of privacy and liberty.
Air travel is safer than any other form of travel. The risk of dying in a terrorist attack is lower than the risk of dying from mechanical failure, human error, or weather. The risk is already so low that it can not be significantly improved by any means.
Life has risks. Travel has risks. Eating has risks. To believe you can eliminate risk is delusional, all you can do is reduce it.
The airline safety we've had since 9/11 has been sufficient, there have been no successful terrorist attacks on US planes since, and these new scanners and feel-up procedures do not make getting dangerous items onto a plane less likely, just marginally less convenient. Terrorists don't care how convenient it is, they'll still get dangerous items aboard. The new scanners a waste of time and money, and a gross invasion of privacy.
Want to make flying safer? Then, let's focus on things that will actually make flying safer, like scanning 100% of cargo, performing extensive background checks on airport employees, using explosive sniffers (dogs or electronic detectors), and behavioral profiling. None of those require giving up any 4th Amendment rights or invading our privacy, and any of them would actually make it more difficult (but still not impossible) for someone to get dangerous items on a plane.
For information on how to actually improve airport security without unreasonable searches, see:
How to Have Effective Airport Security
For information on the privacy and health concerns of the new scanners and pat down procedures, see:
http://dontscan.us/
http://www.tjradcliffe.com/?p=114
http://myhelicaltryst.blogspot.com/2010/11/tsa-x-ray-backscatter-body-scanner.html
http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/SecuritySystems/ucm231857.htm
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24331/
For information on how to protest the use of the scanners and pat downs see:
http://wewontfly.com/
http://www.facebook.com/wontfly
Other viewpoints on the new TSA procedures:
http://c6rm3n.blogspot.com/2011/01/tsa-nanny-state-and-more.html
Here are my questions for anyone who believes the new scanners and pat down procedures are justified because they make flying safer:
Q: Would you rather be blown up by a bomb around a terrorist's waist, or a bomb up his a$$?
I know it's a little crude, but it's intended to be shocking. The new scanners won't detect bombs or other items inside the body, won't detect powders, and according to a GAO report, probably would not have detected the "underwear" bomb.
Q: Aren't there better scanners that can detect those?
A: Yes, they're called "trace detectors" or "sniffers", and they don't require x-raying you or taking naked images of you for them to work. They also don't require anyone touching you. We've been using them in a limited capacity for years, so why should we use expensive and invasive new scanners that won't work as well?
Here's an Interesting interview with a former TSA/FAA inspector:
Interviewer: "Are people in airports that don't have the new AIT scanners less safe?"
Consultant: "No."
She also stated that the TSA plans to make the full-body scanners the primary screening method, replacing the metal detectors. So, while right now, few people will go through the scanner, eventually, they intend to make everyone go through.
-----
Bottom line, the new "porno scanners" and "en-hands-ed feel-up" procedures are security theater, they give the illusion of better security, but they do not improve safety at all. At the same time, they're grossly invasive and therefore, violate your 4th Amendment rights agains "unreasonable" searches of your person.
No amount of security can keep all dangerous items off an aircraft. A dedicated attacker will find a way, even if everyone were submitted to strip searches, body cavity searches, x-rays, explosive sniffers, and any other form of "security" you can dream up.
You can not prevent all attacks on board, much less all the external attacks (LAWS rocket, SAM, etc.) or simply attacking the terminal before going though security.
When you finally realize that it's impossible to have complete "safety and security", then the only conclusion left is that at some point there is "enough safety and security", and each increase comes at a loss of privacy and liberty.
Air travel is safer than any other form of travel. The risk of dying in a terrorist attack is lower than the risk of dying from mechanical failure, human error, or weather. The risk is already so low that it can not be significantly improved by any means.
Life has risks. Travel has risks. Eating has risks. To believe you can eliminate risk is delusional, all you can do is reduce it.
The airline safety we've had since 9/11 has been sufficient, there have been no successful terrorist attacks on US planes since, and these new scanners and feel-up procedures do not make getting dangerous items onto a plane less likely, just marginally less convenient. Terrorists don't care how convenient it is, they'll still get dangerous items aboard. The new scanners a waste of time and money, and a gross invasion of privacy.
Want to make flying safer? Then, let's focus on things that will actually make flying safer, like scanning 100% of cargo, performing extensive background checks on airport employees, using explosive sniffers (dogs or electronic detectors), and behavioral profiling. None of those require giving up any 4th Amendment rights or invading our privacy, and any of them would actually make it more difficult (but still not impossible) for someone to get dangerous items on a plane.
For information on how to actually improve airport security without unreasonable searches, see:
How to Have Effective Airport Security
For information on the privacy and health concerns of the new scanners and pat down procedures, see:
http://dontscan.us/
http://www.tjradcliffe.com/?p=114
http://myhelicaltryst.blogspot.com/2010/11/tsa-x-ray-backscatter-body-scanner.html
http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/SecuritySystems/ucm231857.htm
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24331/
For information on how to protest the use of the scanners and pat downs see:
http://wewontfly.com/
http://www.facebook.com/wontfly
Other viewpoints on the new TSA procedures:
http://c6rm3n.blogspot.com/2011/01/tsa-nanny-state-and-more.html
Are the New TSA AIT Scanners and Enhanced Pat-downs Effective?
Originally published as a note on my Facebook page Dec 1, 2010.
No, they're not. There are many reputable sources of information that say they don't make flying any safer. A GAO report prior to the purchase of the AIT scanners said the new scanners "probably would not" detect the "underwear bomber" from Den 2009. The TSA's response to that is "we believe the would". No evidence, just a belief. The scanners manufacture indicates they're not effective at detecting low density materials, including powered, liquid, and plastic explosives.
Here's a Q&A with TSA head John Pistole, in which he either admits the procedures are of limited value, or avoids answering questions about their effectiveness. Of course, he spins it in the most favorable way he can, but a little "reading between the lines", aka, noticing not only what he says, but what he doesn't say/answer will reveal a lot.
In that interview, he also says "We're not in the threat-elimination business. We can't do that, but we can try to mitigate some of them." That's a detail that most people miss, and overlook. Said another way, the TSA knows they can't stop all the attacks, in fact, if you read carefully, "we can try to mitigate some of them" indicates that at best, these procedures might make it a little more difficult for an attacker. Is it really worth giving up your privacy and being subjected to very revealing (and possibly dangerous) scanners or invasive pat downs because "we can try to mitigate some of them"?
Update: 2011-12-21
Smoke Screening Best article yet on the insanity and uselessness of the TSA approach to security. Security expert Bruce Schneier explains and demonstrates in a US airport just how ineffective the TSA practices are.
No, they're not. There are many reputable sources of information that say they don't make flying any safer. A GAO report prior to the purchase of the AIT scanners said the new scanners "probably would not" detect the "underwear bomber" from Den 2009. The TSA's response to that is "we believe the would". No evidence, just a belief. The scanners manufacture indicates they're not effective at detecting low density materials, including powered, liquid, and plastic explosives.
Here's a Q&A with TSA head John Pistole, in which he either admits the procedures are of limited value, or avoids answering questions about their effectiveness. Of course, he spins it in the most favorable way he can, but a little "reading between the lines", aka, noticing not only what he says, but what he doesn't say/answer will reveal a lot.
In that interview, he also says "We're not in the threat-elimination business. We can't do that, but we can try to mitigate some of them." That's a detail that most people miss, and overlook. Said another way, the TSA knows they can't stop all the attacks, in fact, if you read carefully, "we can try to mitigate some of them" indicates that at best, these procedures might make it a little more difficult for an attacker. Is it really worth giving up your privacy and being subjected to very revealing (and possibly dangerous) scanners or invasive pat downs because "we can try to mitigate some of them"?
Update: 2011-12-21
Smoke Screening Best article yet on the insanity and uselessness of the TSA approach to security. Security expert Bruce Schneier explains and demonstrates in a US airport just how ineffective the TSA practices are.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Do the New TSA Security Practices Violate the 4th Amendment?
Let me start by noting that I'm not opposed to airport security, I believe some level of security is necessary and appropriate. I am not a lawyer, so this is not legal advice. However, I can do research. Let's begin by looking at the text of the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution so it's clear what rights we're talking about.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
I found a paper written in 2008 by a law school student, which specifically examines the constitutionality of using the backscatter scanners for airport security screening. Excerpts from this paper. The paper contains full case citations, which I've omitted for clarity and brevity.
The Court stated that evaluation of airport searches should be conducted using standards related to “administrative” searches.
...
To be valid, administrative searches must meet the standard of reasonableness as required by the Fourth Amendment. To be reasonable, a passenger “screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.” Consequently, valid passenger screening searches at airports must acknowledge a person’s right to decide not to board an airplane and therefore not be subject to the search.
The Court suggested that airports make the options available to passengers approaching screening areas so obvious that someone who decides to board an airplane has consented to the screening. However, at the time the incident at issue occurred, in 1971, “[t]he nature and scope of airport searches were not then widely known.” Therefore, without clear notice of the choice to be screened or not board the airplane, attempting to board the airplane was not necessarily consent.
...
The Ninth Circuit [court, stated] that under Davis, screening procedures at airports must be reasonable to comply with the Fourth Amendment. “An airport screening search is reasonable if: (1) it is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly.”
In it's report on the scanners, the GAO stated:
...it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident....
The millimeter wave scanners do not reliably image low density materials such as powdered, liquid, or gel explosives. The backscatter scanners only penetrate about 1-2 mm into the skin, so they don't detect items concealed inside the body, or under folds or flaps of skin. Neither system can actually detect explosives, they merely image the shape and rely upon the operator to detect an "anomaly" in the image. USA Today published portions of a Q&A session they conducted with TSA chief John Pistole, in which he admits to those limitations.
Bomb sniffing dogs and electronic trace detectors, aka "sniffers" are far more effective at detecting explosives than are the scanners. Neither dogs nor electronic trace detectors involve invasive searches or pat downs. The FBI and military use explosive detecting dogs because they're more effective, cheaper, portable, and don't require someone to stop and pose for them to be effective.
Below are my conclusions:
So, we have expensive scanners, that don't reliably detect the very types of explosives and devices that have been used in the attempts that have been made since 9/11. These scanners effectively create and display a "nude picture" of the person scanned, which is clearly an invasion of privacy. These scanners do not make flying any safer than the prior screening process using metal detectors.
As the backscatter scanners are neither the least intensive nor most effective technologies currently available for the detection of weapons or explosives, the use of these scanners is in direct conflict with prior court findings and the established criteria for "reasonableness" for airport screening. Therefore, using these scanners as a primary screening device fails to meet the standard and is a violation of the 4th Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches.
Furthermore, the nature and extent of what is visible to operators of the backscatter scanners and the nature and extent of the enhanced pat down procedures is not yet widely known, therefore, by the previous findings of the court, most passengers may not have consented. I assert that if the TSA where honest with people about how detailed the images are, and how invasive the pat downs are, most people would not consent. When informed of the fact that they don't make flying any safer, I believe very few would consent.
Note, that the author of the referenced paper studying the constitutionality of these scanners arrived at a similar conclusion. He/She notes that the backscatter scanners might pass the test if they're a secondary screening device. However, that point is moot now that the TSA has stated that they intend to use (and in fact are using) the new scanners as a primary screening device.
Burden of Proof:
Given that an "unreasonable search" without a warrant is prohibited by the 4th Amendment, any agency implementing an administrative search is requesting an exception to do something that is explicitly prohibited unless it falls within the strict requirements for an administrative search. That puts the burden of proving that a search (and methods/equipment used for a search) meets the explicit requirements to be classified as an administrative search upon the person/agency performing the search. Thus, the TSA must prove that these scanners meet the criteria set forth above. That they have not done so, and in fact have refused to provide any proof of their effectiveness as compared to less invasive and less intensive methods, means they have not met the criteria for an administrative search, and therefore, are in violation of the 4th Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable search".
The "Enhanced Pat Downs":
The new "en-hands-ed pat downs" as I prefer to call them, are also a gross violation. They feel you all over, including your genitals, butt, and breasts. They're more intensive than the police use when you're arrested, or when you're entering prison. They amount to being "groped" which is a type of sexual assault. That is not acceptable, it's not legal, and we can not allow it to continue.
These "pat downs" are being performed on people who haven't even been accused of a crime, much less arrested or convicted. They're being performed on children, teens, adults, senior citizens, etc. People in a wheelchair and those with many types of medical implants or prosthetics will always receive one of these "pat downs" either because they can't go through the detector/scanner, or because they will always trigger an alert on the detector/scanner.
There is nothing "reasonable" about groping passengers. There is no way this can be considered to pass the "reasonableness" test, given that it must be primary screening method for many people due to their use of medical devices.
This is not a "slippery slope" we're on, it's a steep hill of solid ice, with no way to get traction once you go over the edge. At the bottom of the hill are whips and shackles. We must demand that the government stop violating our rights.
But don’t take my word for it, research it yourself, all the legal citations are in the document I linked at the beginning. For another view, check out this op-ed piece in the Washington Post. It covers some of what I cover above, and it's from a law professor.
I believe it's possible to improve airport security without invading our privacy or violating our rights. There are less invasive, less expensive, and more effective ways to implement airport security. We need to demand that they use legal, practical, sane, and effective security procedures, not these gross invasions of our privacy and illegal searches of our persons. I'll detail some of those methods in my next blog post.
Update 2010-12-08 @ 17:15
Updated to clarify that MMW scanners can't image low density materials and that neither type of scanner actually detects anything, they require an operator to notice anomalous shapes.
Update 2011-07-21 @ 12:15
Added section on burden of proof.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
I found a paper written in 2008 by a law school student, which specifically examines the constitutionality of using the backscatter scanners for airport security screening. Excerpts from this paper. The paper contains full case citations, which I've omitted for clarity and brevity.
The Court stated that evaluation of airport searches should be conducted using standards related to “administrative” searches.
...
To be valid, administrative searches must meet the standard of reasonableness as required by the Fourth Amendment. To be reasonable, a passenger “screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.” Consequently, valid passenger screening searches at airports must acknowledge a person’s right to decide not to board an airplane and therefore not be subject to the search.
The Court suggested that airports make the options available to passengers approaching screening areas so obvious that someone who decides to board an airplane has consented to the screening. However, at the time the incident at issue occurred, in 1971, “[t]he nature and scope of airport searches were not then widely known.” Therefore, without clear notice of the choice to be screened or not board the airplane, attempting to board the airplane was not necessarily consent.
...
The Ninth Circuit [court, stated] that under Davis, screening procedures at airports must be reasonable to comply with the Fourth Amendment. “An airport screening search is reasonable if: (1) it is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly.”
In it's report on the scanners, the GAO stated:
...it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident....
The millimeter wave scanners do not reliably image low density materials such as powdered, liquid, or gel explosives. The backscatter scanners only penetrate about 1-2 mm into the skin, so they don't detect items concealed inside the body, or under folds or flaps of skin. Neither system can actually detect explosives, they merely image the shape and rely upon the operator to detect an "anomaly" in the image. USA Today published portions of a Q&A session they conducted with TSA chief John Pistole, in which he admits to those limitations.
Bomb sniffing dogs and electronic trace detectors, aka "sniffers" are far more effective at detecting explosives than are the scanners. Neither dogs nor electronic trace detectors involve invasive searches or pat downs. The FBI and military use explosive detecting dogs because they're more effective, cheaper, portable, and don't require someone to stop and pose for them to be effective.
Below are my conclusions:
So, we have expensive scanners, that don't reliably detect the very types of explosives and devices that have been used in the attempts that have been made since 9/11. These scanners effectively create and display a "nude picture" of the person scanned, which is clearly an invasion of privacy. These scanners do not make flying any safer than the prior screening process using metal detectors.
As the backscatter scanners are neither the least intensive nor most effective technologies currently available for the detection of weapons or explosives, the use of these scanners is in direct conflict with prior court findings and the established criteria for "reasonableness" for airport screening. Therefore, using these scanners as a primary screening device fails to meet the standard and is a violation of the 4th Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches.
Furthermore, the nature and extent of what is visible to operators of the backscatter scanners and the nature and extent of the enhanced pat down procedures is not yet widely known, therefore, by the previous findings of the court, most passengers may not have consented. I assert that if the TSA where honest with people about how detailed the images are, and how invasive the pat downs are, most people would not consent. When informed of the fact that they don't make flying any safer, I believe very few would consent.
Note, that the author of the referenced paper studying the constitutionality of these scanners arrived at a similar conclusion. He/She notes that the backscatter scanners might pass the test if they're a secondary screening device. However, that point is moot now that the TSA has stated that they intend to use (and in fact are using) the new scanners as a primary screening device.
Burden of Proof:
Given that an "unreasonable search" without a warrant is prohibited by the 4th Amendment, any agency implementing an administrative search is requesting an exception to do something that is explicitly prohibited unless it falls within the strict requirements for an administrative search. That puts the burden of proving that a search (and methods/equipment used for a search) meets the explicit requirements to be classified as an administrative search upon the person/agency performing the search. Thus, the TSA must prove that these scanners meet the criteria set forth above. That they have not done so, and in fact have refused to provide any proof of their effectiveness as compared to less invasive and less intensive methods, means they have not met the criteria for an administrative search, and therefore, are in violation of the 4th Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable search".
The "Enhanced Pat Downs":
The new "en-hands-ed pat downs" as I prefer to call them, are also a gross violation. They feel you all over, including your genitals, butt, and breasts. They're more intensive than the police use when you're arrested, or when you're entering prison. They amount to being "groped" which is a type of sexual assault. That is not acceptable, it's not legal, and we can not allow it to continue.
These "pat downs" are being performed on people who haven't even been accused of a crime, much less arrested or convicted. They're being performed on children, teens, adults, senior citizens, etc. People in a wheelchair and those with many types of medical implants or prosthetics will always receive one of these "pat downs" either because they can't go through the detector/scanner, or because they will always trigger an alert on the detector/scanner.
There is nothing "reasonable" about groping passengers. There is no way this can be considered to pass the "reasonableness" test, given that it must be primary screening method for many people due to their use of medical devices.
This is not a "slippery slope" we're on, it's a steep hill of solid ice, with no way to get traction once you go over the edge. At the bottom of the hill are whips and shackles. We must demand that the government stop violating our rights.
But don’t take my word for it, research it yourself, all the legal citations are in the document I linked at the beginning. For another view, check out this op-ed piece in the Washington Post. It covers some of what I cover above, and it's from a law professor.
I believe it's possible to improve airport security without invading our privacy or violating our rights. There are less invasive, less expensive, and more effective ways to implement airport security. We need to demand that they use legal, practical, sane, and effective security procedures, not these gross invasions of our privacy and illegal searches of our persons. I'll detail some of those methods in my next blog post.
Update 2010-12-08 @ 17:15
Updated to clarify that MMW scanners can't image low density materials and that neither type of scanner actually detects anything, they require an operator to notice anomalous shapes.
Update 2011-07-21 @ 12:15
Added section on burden of proof.
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